Formulas and Flexibility in Trade Negotiations: Sensitive Agricultural Products in the WTO's Doha Agenda
In recent years, a common feature of trade negotiations involving developing countries has been the use of a formula approach to tariff cutting, coupled with provisions for smaller, or zero, cuts in particular products. This approach follows a pattern observed in earlier WTO Rounds (Martin and Winters 1996) and regional agreements (Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998) , where ambitious tariff reduction goals were combined with discretion for particular, politically-sensitive, products. One difference is that the specific products to be subjected to smaller cuts were typically directly negotiated in earlier agreements, while the Doha agenda "modalities" for agriculture specify the share of products allowed smaller cuts, leaving the choice of products to the discretion of the importer.
The approach being followed in the WTO agricultural negotiations (WTO 2004 (WTO , 2008 ) specifies larger proportional cuts in higher bound tariffs but allows reduced cuts for "sensitive" products selected by members. Earlier work suggests this approach may make market access gains particularly susceptible to erosion through exclusion of a small number of goods, particularly in the industrial countries where the variance of agricultural tariffs is very high (Jean, Laborde and Martin 2006) .
While discretion for smaller cuts on their own sensitive products is attractive to individual policy makers, it raises difficult questions for policy makers and for analysts making ex ante evaluations of proposed agreements. These problems are particularly acute for policy makers from small developing countries. While large traders may have the resources to estimate the direct impact of key partners' choices on their market access reasonably well, small developing countries frequently have difficulty doing so. Both groups remain vulnerable to importers changing their choice of products at the last moment. Analysts attempting to provide policy makers with ex ante assessments of proposed global agreements face a different and perhaps even more serious challengethey need a consistent basis for assessing the use of these flexibilities in 153 WTO member countries.
One widely-used approach to ex ante assessment is to assume that flexibility will be used for the highest bound (Sharma 2006) or applied (WTO 2006) tariffs. These approaches lead to a sharp conclusion-that the impacts of flexibilities on cuts in average tariffs will be small. The highly variable, and frequently large, gaps between bound and applied agricultural tariffs (Jean, Laborde and Martin 2006 ) raise important questionswould products with high bound tariffs really be selected if the bound rate remains above the applied rate even after the bound rate is cut, and hence no reduction in applied rates is required? Even high applied rates may not be subject to cuts if the binding overhang on these products is sufficiently large. Further, these approaches ignore the importance of the product-high tariffs are frequently observed on very minor products.
To deal with these concerns, Jean, Laborde and Martin (2006) proposed a minimization-of-tariff-revenue-loss rule that takes into account the size of the cut in applied tariffs resulting from the formula and binding overhang, and the initial value of imports. This approach leads to a strikingly different conclusion-that even a small number of sensitive products can dramatically reduce the cuts in average agricultural tariffs. In this situation, it seems particularly desirable to have an approach with stronger behavioral foundations.
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To estimate the effects of flexibilities requires a forecast of the products likely to be chosen, and an estimate of the effects of these choices on efficiency and market access. We first develop a simple, theoretically-well-grounded, model of the preferences of policy makers, and then use it to assess which agricultural products WTO members are likely to treat as sensitive. Our approach focuses on policy choices within a single country, building on the framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994) and others in the political-economy literature. It provides a much-needed ex ante assessment of the impact of policy choices on market access and welfare, and a basis for ex post testing should the current negotiations be successfully completed.
An important question for current and future negotiations is whether the combination of ambitious tariff-cutting formulas with flexibilities allowing small cuts on relatively high tariffs makes sense from economic or mercantilist perspectives. To shed light on this issue, we use the Anderson-Neary (2007) approach with the most disaggregated data available at the international level to assess the implications of flexibility for both welfare and market access.
We assume that the agricultural tariff prior to the negotiations results from maximization of a government objective function along the lines of the GrossmanHelpman (1994) model. This approach seems appropriate for agricultural tariffs in the current negotiations because they have not been effectively disciplined by multilateral agreements (Hathaway and Ingco 1996) . We consider a liberalization agreement involving a tariff-reduction formula together with flexibility for sensitive products, and focus on the way policy makers use this flexibility at any given level of world prices. The combined effect of the decisions by all 153 members leads to changes in domestic and 4 international prices that members must take into account in deciding whether to accept the agreement.
Our first step is to develop an objective function for government policy making.
Then, in Section II, we use this function to assess the implications of changes in tariffs under alternative assumptions about the structure of preferences. In Section III, we discuss the data and tariff-cutting formulas on which we base our analysis. Section IV contains applications to real-world data designed to assess the likely outcomes for average tariffs; to provide comparisons with earlier approaches; and to examine the sensitivity of outcomes to different rules for sensitive products. In Section V, we examine the implications of sensitive products for economic welfare in the country utilizing the flexibility and for the market access opportunities of partner countries. Section VI concludes.
I. Representing Governments' Objective Functions
We begin by specifying an objective function for policy makers that takes into account the benefits to politicians from providing protection to particular sectors while considering the costs to consumers and taxpayers of providing this protection. Our political-economy objective function-based on Grossman and Helpman (1994, equation 5)-is expressed as:
Where z(p,u)=e(p,u)-g(p) is the trade expenditure function, defined as the difference between the consumer expenditure function e(p,u) defined over domestic prices, p and the utility level of the representative household, u, and a net revenue function, g(p), defined over domestic prices for given factor endowments; p* is the vector of world 5 prices for traded goods, so that (p-p*) is a vector of specific tariff rates; z p = e p -g p is a vector of net imports; z p´( p-p*) is tariff revenues, assumed to be redistributed to the household; and the elements of h reflect the valuation by governments of changes in domestic prices, over and above their impact on general economic welfare. We consider only tariffs because domestic and export subsidies are dealt with under different "pillars" of the negotiations.
Like Grossman and Helpman (1994, proposition 2) and virtually all subsequent applications based on this model, we assume that importers and governments view import prices as fixed, so that changing tariffs from their initial level involves a reduction in the value of the government's objective function. For individual governments choosing their own protection levels on individual commodities, this seems reasonable for relatively homogenous agricultural products given that the estimated export supply elasticities for homogenous goods are five times as high as for other products (Broda, Limao and Weinstein 2008, p2033) . It also seems consistent with the approach taken by agricultural policy makers dealing with product-specific issues such as the "tariffication" of non-tariff barriers (Hathaway and Ingco 1996) .
If we move beyond the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model, the h weights may also reflect a number of political-economy features identified by authors such as Anderson and Hayami (1986) , Lindert (1991) , Soloaga (1998), Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2004) , and Dutt and Mitra (2010) that influence how much protection a particular agricultural sector will receive. These include: (i) how effectively the sector is organized; (ii) the impact of own-output prices on returns to specific factors in that sector; (iii) adverse impacts on the costs of other politically-influential groups of 6 protecting a particular sector; and (iv) the ratio of imports to domestic consumption that determines the balance of benefits between tariff revenues and transfers to producers, and (v) the degree of concentration in the sector. In contrast with the studies above, our objective is not to explain the premium placed by policy makers on higher prices for particular goods. Rather, we use the observed policy choices to infer the elements of hsomething that is feasible for highly disaggregated products.
Since we assume that the political-economy objective function is being maximized in the initial equilibrium, we can use the first order conditions to solve for h:
where -z pp 0 (p 0 -p*) is the marginal welfare cost of tariff changes around (p-p*), and the superscript 0 refers to values at the initial equilibrium (since world prices are assumed to be constant, p* 0 = p*). The revealed value of h for product i clearly depends on the tariff for that sector. However, h i depends also on the slope of the demand curve, z ii , and the cross-price effects with other goods subject to tariffs, z ij . In addition, for any given import demand elasticity, the value of h i increases with import volume. Note that h i for a good with a zero tariff will be negative if there are positive tariffs on its substitutes and none on any complements. Sectors that are organized will likely have positive values of h i while unorganized sectors are expected to have negative values. Equations (1) and (2) together show the strong link between our approach and the Grossman-Helpman (1994) formulation.
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At any point where producers and consumers are making optimizing decisions relative to domestic prices, z pp p =0. Equation (2) can thus be simplified to: 
Equation (1′) provides the basis for our subsequent analysis.
II. Implications of Tariff Changes for the Objective Function
A second-order Taylor-Series expansion of equation (1′) around the initial equilibrium provides insights into the implications of tariff changes that change p relative to p*. We begin by taking the first and second derivatives of (1′) with respect to prices:
For lack of information about the third derivatives of the trade expenditure function, we assume that the trade expenditure function can be adequately represented by a function such as the normalized quadratic introduced by Diewert and Ostensoe (1988) or the symmetric normalized quadratic used by Kohli (1993) to model import demand. As noted by these authors, these are flexible functional forms and hence can provide a secondorder approximation at any point to any twice-differentiable functional form, such as the widely-used, but much less flexible, CES function. Given this assumption, the z ppp term in equation (3) can be dropped and the implications of deviations in tariffs from the domestic political-economy optimum can be analyzed using the Taylor-Series expansion:
Equation (4) where e is initial expenditure on all goods and services, including the non-distorted numeraire, n; s i is the share of expenditure on good i; η ij is the elasticity of demand for good i relative to the price of good j; and the vector p refers to proportional changes in domestic prices. Where the bound tariff equals the applied,
where c i is the tariff cut required by the formula. The relationship is less direct, but still readily computable, when bound tariffs exceed applied rates. We express ΔG relative to e, without loss of generality, because this allows us to use value shares, rather than gross values, as weights on the elasticity matrix.
For simplicity and tractability, a product-by-product analysis can prove useful. This is possible based on (4´), since the impact of allowing sensitive-product treatment for product i on the government's objective function can be computed as the difference 9 between the welfare loss with the formula applied to product i, is the increase in the price from the post-formula level as a proportion of its initial domestic price, we obtain, following the steps outlined in the Technical Appendix:
A key insight from equation (5) not available from equation (4) is the potential importance of the size of the formula cuts on other goods for the selection of good i.
Unfortunately, we do not have the matrix of own and cross-price elasticities for over 5000 products included in equation (4'). If we use CES preferences to obtain local, theoretically-consistent, estimates of these elasticities, the own-price elasticities are given by -(1-s i ).σ , where σ is the elasticity of substitution, and the cross-price elasticities, η ij are given by σ.s j . As shown in the Technical Appendix, equations (4') and (5) can then be rewritten including cross-price effects as:
Note that in this CES framework the choice of sensitive products is independent of σ.
Two features of equation (5' 
In the CES case, equation (6) provides a simple rule of thumb for selecting sensitive products that depends only on observable information on the expenditure share of the good in the presence of tariffs, s i ; the size of the price cut implied by the formula and any binding overhang; and the extent to which sensitive product selection allows a smaller cut in its price, i � . The intuition of this measure is clear: it compares two triangles-formed by multiplying the elasticity of import demand -(1-s i )σ by a squared proportional change in prices-to measure the reduction in the loss of policy maker welfare when sensitive products are allowed.
The logic of the simplification involved in moving from equation (5') to equation (6) might also be used to justify a similar simplification of equation (5):
This approach follows Feenstra (1995) in using just the own-price terms to assess the implications of a tariff regime. It is particularly attractive since Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) provide estimates of exactly the own-price elasticities required for this approach.
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III. Data and Tariff Formulas
We use the MAcMapHS6 v1.1 database (Bouët et al. 2008) The negotiations specify cuts in WTO bound tariffs, which are frequently well above applied rates. This binding overhang means that reductions in bound tariffs will not always bring about corresponding reductions in applied rates or increases in market access. A detailed dataset on bound duties (see Bchir et al. 2006 ) conformable with the MAcMapHS6 applied rate data was used to specify the cuts in bound rates. Applied rates were reduced to the extent that the new bound rate declined below the initial applied rate.
and reforms agreed by WTO accession countries.
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The analysis uses the tariff cut proposal that has shaped the negotiations-the proposal by the G-20 of a tiered formula with four bands and three inflexion points (G-20 2005) . For the industrial countries, this involves proportional cuts in bound tariffs that increase through four tiers to reach 75 percent on tariffs above 75 percent. For developing countries, the cuts rise to 40 percent on tariffs above 130 percent. Tariffs are capped at 100 percent for developed countries and 150 percent for developing countries. Leastdeveloped countries are not required to undertake any reduction commitments.
Bound tariffs on sensitive products can be cut by one third or two thirds of the formula cut, with increases in TRQs required to compensate trading partners for the resulting loss of market access (WTO 2008) . We assume that the combined effect of the tariff cut and TRQ expansion for a sensitive product with a TRQ is one-half the formula cut.
IV. Experiments and Impacts on Average Tariffs
We used four different approaches to identifying sensitive products. The first was to solve equation (1') using nonlinear integer programming. However, we encountered multiple solutions using this nonlinear approach. We therefore turned to approaches based on the second-order approximations discussed in Section II. Our initial results were obtained by solving equation (4'') using the SBB (Branch & Bound) GAMS® solver for Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming (MINLP) (see GAMS 2010) with up to 2 percent of products allowed as sensitive. This was complemented by simple one-product-at-atime selections using equation (6), and equation (7) with the own-price elasticities of Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) .
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The scenario against which we assess the impact of sensitive products applies the formulas to all products, without exception ("Formula" column in Table 1 ). We first compare these results against those using our three approaches to identifying two percent of sensitive products. We then compare these results with those from the three ad hoc approaches used in earlier studies-"highest bound", "highest applied" and "tariff losses". Next, we examine the potential sensitivity of our results to whether or not sensitive products include "sin" products, which might have high tariffs to discourage consumption rather than for political-economy reasons. Then, we consider the sensitivity of the results to the number of tariffs allowed sensitive treatment. Finally, we consider the implications of an alternative approach of basing the share of sensitive products on the percentage of imports, rather than a percentage of tariff lines.
Our results for the "Formula" scenario are given in the second column of Table 1 .
Even though the formulas more than halve average bound tariffs worldwide, the reductions in applied rates are smaller because of binding overhang. With no sensitive products, the average tariff for non-LDC WTO members is cut by 6 percentage points, from 14.6 percent to 8.6 percent ( Table 1 , column "Formula"). Among the main countries shown in Table 1 , only Canada, the EU, EFTA, Japan and South Korea display more than a 5 percentage point cut in applied rates. Indeed liberalization appears to be overwhelmingly concentrated in Japan, EFTA and Korea, with very limited liberalization elsewhere. 5 For many countries, applied duties are hardly changed: 8 out of the 18 countries and groups shown in Table 1 experience a decline in applied duties of less than two percentage points. The formula considered narrows the binding overhang in many cases, without substantially changing applied rates. Table 3 displays the products most frequently selected as sensitive by developed and developing countries when 2 percent of sensitive products are selected simultaneously using equation (4''). For comparison purposes, Appendix Table 1 compares these products with those selected using the highest-average tariff rules, and considers the coverage of agricultural imports for the different sets of products considered. This comparison shows that selecting products based on the highest tariffs leads to frequent inclusion of minor products, such as "foliage branches", "maize stalks", and "garlic" in the industrial countries and "other cereals", with a share in agricultural imports of only one-hundredth of a percent in developing countries. A striking difference between the lists selected using equation (2´) and the highest-tariff rules is in the share of agricultural imports covered. Our political-economy approach results in a list of most-common sensitive products covering 80 (63) percent of agricultural imports into the industrial (developing) countries, while the highest bound tariff rule leads to a list covering only 5 (7) percent.
The resulting impacts for countries' own weighted-average tariffs are presented in Table 1 (column "Sens 2"). Allowing 2 percent sensitive products, the cut in the world wide average applied duty drops from 6 percentage points to 3.1. Four relativelyhighly-protected Harmonized System chapters, Meat and offal (02), Cereals (10), Fruits (08) and Sugar (17), accounting for 27 percent of total imports, contribute 67 percent of the tariff cut without exclusions, but 80 percent of the reduction in tariff cuts when sensitive products are introduced. For developing countries, four chapters (01-Meat, 10-Cereals, 12-Oilseeds and 24-Tobacco) cover 25 percent of total imports and contribute 51 percent of the basic cut but 64 percent of the reduction in the cut.
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Using the simplified criterion in equation (6) ("Sens 2-simple") changes the aggregate results very little. This is reassuring, given that algorithms for simultaneous product selection are unlikely to be available to policy makers. The results based on equation (7) ("Sens 2-elas") are somewhat higher than those for "Sens 2-simple", reflecting the fact that the elasticity criterion used in their selection does not enter the calculation of the standard trade-weighted averages. with the highest applied tariffs ("Sens 2-highest applied") are chosen as sensitive (Martin and Wang 2004; WTO 2006) , the impact on average tariffs is still much smaller. These two rules select many minor products with high tariffs.
Column (8), "Sens 2-tariff loss" selects sensitive products by minimizing tariff revenue losses. At the aggregate level, the results using this criterion differ little from those using our political-economy approach. At a disaggregated level, we find that our political-economy criteria pick some products-such as virgin olive oil for the European Union-that seem likely to be treated as exceptions, but are not identified using the tariff revenue loss criterion.
As is clear from Table 3 , some of the WTO-agricultural products selected as "sensitive" are "sin" tax commodities such as cigarettes or alcohol. If high duties on these products are being used to raise revenues or to reduce externalities, countries may not follow a political-economy rule when choosing sensitive products. To guard against this, "Sens 2-sin" is derived using the same approach as "Sens 2" but excluding "sin" commodities such as alcohol and tobacco from the sensitive product category. This exclusion is found to lead to cuts in average tariffs that are similar to those without this exclusion. The increase in the cut with this exclusion is from 4.3 to 4.5 percent in the industrial countries, and from 1.2 to 1.6 percent in developing countries. This exclusion does change the composition of the products selected. In developed countries, preparations of meat and fish, and dairy products become more important, as do dairy products, fruits, meats and fats in developing countries.
While our analysis so far has focused on allowing 2 percent of tariff lines, many WTO members have sought much higher percentages of tariff lines. We find that raising the number of sensitive products to 4 percent ("Sens 4") using the political economy criterion in equation (4'') has only a small impact, except in a few cases such as Japan and EFTA. Overall, the extent of delivered liberalization is only slightly reduced because sheltering just 2 percent of products is enough to greatly reduce the cut in average tariffs. 8 To shed light on the differences between constraints based on trade and those based on tariff lines, we compare the results for "Sens 2" and "Sens 4" with those where imports are constrained by import value-"Sens 2-trade" and "Sens 4-trade". This comparison shows considerable differences. The global reduction in average tariffs is 4.8 percent under "Sens 2-trade", as against 3.1 percent under "Sens 2".
As compared to the "Formula" scenario, allowing 2 percent of imports as sensitive products based on trade causes the cut in world average tariffs to decline from 6.0 percent to 4.8 percent, with limited reductions in the resulting tariff cuts in most cases, in contrast with the dramatic and unpredictable reductions in disciplines associated with sensitive product limits based on tariff lines. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the number of sensitive products and the final level of tariffs in a general way, by plotting the relationship between the number of sensitive products allowed, and the average level of applied protection. When the constraint is expressed in terms of number of products, the curve is indeed extremely steep near the y-axis: a very small share of sensitive products is enough to sweep out a significant part of the applied tariff cut. This is even clearer for developed countries than for developing countries. When defined as an import share, in contrast, changes in the number of sensitive products have a far less precipitous impact on tariff cuts. As far as developed countries are concerned, allowing 5 percent of initial imports to be defined as sensitive products reduces tariff cuts by approximately one third, 10 percent of imports would reduce them by almost two-thirds.
While trade is also an imperfect criterion-since highly-restricted products are likely to have small imports-it seems clear that its deficiencies as a basis for specifying sensitive products are less serious than those associated with the number of tariff lines.
There is an important underlying reason for this better performance-external trade reflects the interests of the exporter rather than solely those of interest groups within the importing country. Table 2 presents results corresponding to those in Table 1 for the case of 2 percent sensitive products but this time for the protection faced by each country. A sharp difference between the results for protection applied and protection faced is evident for developing countries. For most developing countries, allowing sensitive products reduces the extent of required own-liberalization very little because the cuts in their own applied rates in the absence of sensitive products are quite small. By contrast, allowing sensitive products results in a very substantial reduction in market access gains. The average reduction in tariffs facing developing countries declines by almost 3 percentage pointsfrom 5.5 percent to 2.7 percent.
V. Implications for Welfare and Market Access
The average tariff measures reported in Tables 1 and 2 These results imply that it is important to look beyond average impacts when analyzing the impact of free trade on efficiency and market access. Reductions in tariffs resulting from the formula approach raise welfare both through the reduction in the generalized mean tariff and through reductions in the generalized variance. These results strongly reinforce the need to go beyond average impacts.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The impact of exceptions from tariff-cutting formulas in the Doha negotiations has been a major source of uncertainty and conflict. Some widely-used rules of thumb for their selection suggest that their overall impacts would be minor. We derive approaches to selection based on a political-economy framework applicable at a fine level of disaggregation, and estimate likely impacts on key outcomes from the negotiations.
We show that allowing even a limited number of products to be subjected to smaller cuts is likely to substantially reduce the extent of trade liberalization in the developed countries, while developing countries gain little in this mercantilist sense. In contrast, the costs to exporters are shared, and developing countries see their market access gains fall substantially with sensitive product exceptions.
We find that approaches to sensitive-product identification based only on the height of the tariff greatly underestimate their impact. However, we identify a simple approach using only readily-available information on the share of the product at domestic prices, the depth of the formula cut and the "relief" provided by flexibility that generates 21 impacts consistent with our more complex models. The tariff-revenue-loss criterion used in our earlier work appears to track closely the overall impact of our full model results.
A problem for exporters associated with allowing a certain number of tariff lines to be sensitive is that this criterion does not take into account the importance of these tariff lines to the exporter. If we do this in a crude way by restricting the number of products on the basis of their share in total imports, we find a dramatic reduction in the damage to market access created by sensitive products.
Building on recent work by Anderson and Neary (2007) , we show in addition that, since these exceptions increase the variance of tariffs relative to the formula outcome, their effects on economic welfare are much worse than their effects on market access. In this sense, the combination of steeply progressive tariff formulas and exceptions may be much more rational from a mercantilist point of view than when examined from the perspective of economic welfare and development. Applies the G20's tiered formula (TF), without sensitive products (SPs); Sens 2: TF with 2% SPs selected according to eq. (4''); Sens 2-simple: TF with 2% SPs, selected using eq. (6); Sens 2-elas: TF with 2% SPs, selected using eq. (7); Sens 2-highest bound: TF with 2% SPs, selected by highest bound rates; Sens 2-highest applied: TF with 2% SPs selected by highest applied rates; Sens 2-tariff losses:TF with 2% SPs selected to minimize tariff loss; Sens 2-sin: Sens 2 TF with 4% SPs selected using eq. (4''); Sens 2-trade: TF with 2% SPs , selected using eq. (4''). Numbers in subsequent columns are reductions in percentage points. Column headers name the scenarios: Base: 2001 applied tariffs; Formula: Applies the G20's tiered formula (TF), without sensitive products (SPs); Sens 2: TF with 2% SPs selected according to eq. (4''); Sens 2-simple: TF with 2% SPs, selected using eq. (6); Sens 2-elas: TF with 2% SPs, selected using eq. (7); Sens 2-highest bound: TF with 2% SPs, selected by highest bound rates; Sens 2-highest applied: TF with 2% SPs selected by highest applied rates; Sens 2-tariff losses:TF with 2% SPs selected to minimize tariff loss; Sens 2-sin: Sens 2 TF with 4% SPs selected using eq. (4''); Sens 2-trade: TF with 2% SPs , selected using eq. (4'').. Note: This graph plots the average applied protection level for non-LDC WTO members, once the G20 formula is applied. The share of sensitive products is reported on the x-axis. It is alternatively defined as a share in the number of agricultural products, or as a share in imports. Note that even sensitive products experience a cut in tariffs, although it is smaller than under the formula, so that the curves do not converge towards initial protection levels. 
A. From Equation (4´) to Equation (5):
Looking at the change in policy makers' objective function resulting from using flexibility to reduce the cut in tariffs, we have:
